Monday 16 May 2016

World Patriots





Paul Manafort


 Donald Trump's

Campaign Manager

 

Pro-Russian Party Ties

Alleged





Donald Trump's Campaign Manager


Paul Manafort

  Is Pro-Russian
Lydia Tomkiw


17 August 2016
In a major shake-up of Republican nominee Donald Trump’s campaign, Breitbart News executive Stephen Bannon was named the campaign’s chief executive Wednesday in a move seen as a demotion for campaign chairman Paul Manafort, whose ties to a pro-Russian party in Ukraine have come under scrutiny in recent days with new allegations emerging Wednesday.
Manafort, who worked as a political consultant for the pro-Russian Party of Regions in Ukraine, allegedly helped the party secretly route $2.2 million to two American lobbying firms, the Associated Press reported.




The new allegations come after a Sunday report in the New York Times revealed a secret ledger discovered by Ukrainian anti-corruption authorities that showed nearly $13 million worth of payments intended for Manafort from the party of deposed former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych. Manafort issued a statement earlier this week denying that he had received any such payments
Paul Manafort, campaign manager to Republican Presidential Candidate Donald Trump, escapes a mob of reporters asking about the Republican National Convention Committee on Rules in Cleveland, Ohio, July 14, 2016. Manafort's connections to a pro-Russian party in Ukraine have come under scrutiny in recent days.
Source:


Donald Trump's Campaign Manager Pro-Russian Party Ties Alleged




Who Is Ken Salazar?





Alex Garofalo

16 August, 2016


 Who Is Ken Salazar?




Who Is


Ken Salazar?
Who Is Ken Salazar? 4 Things To Know About Hillary Clinton's White House Transition Leader
Things are looking pretty good for Hillary Clinton in the polls — so good, in fact, that she could not be blamed for starting to think ahead to the White House.
It seems the Democratic Presidential nominee is doing just that. On Tuesday the Clinton campaign announced that the former secretary of state's White House transition team will be led by Ken Salazar. The appointment is a return to public relevance for Salazar, who was rumored to have been considered as a possible Clinton running mate but has been out of government since stepping down as President Barack Obama's Secretary of the Interior in 2013.
“Once Hillary Clinton makes history by being elected as the nation’s first woman President, we want to have a turnkey operation in place so she can hit the ground running right away,” Salazar said in a statement released Tuesday by the Clinton campaign, according to the Denver Post.
Source:


Who Is Ken Salazar?
Salazar, 61, served in Obama's cabinet as Secretary of the Interior, from 2009 to 2013. He previously served as a Democratic Senator from Colorado from 2005 to 2009 where he and Republican Sen. Mel Martinez of Florida became the first Hispanic Senators since 1977. Salazar was also the Attorney General of Colorado for six years from 1999 to 2005 under Republican Gov. Bill Owens.






Hillary Clinton Appoints Ken Salazar To Lead White House Transition



David Sirota


16/08/2016




Hillary Clinton announced that her White House transition team will be led by Ken Salazar — a former lawmaker who left government to become a partner at a major law and lobbying firm. The announcement Tuesday comes as Clinton has campaigned against the so-called “revolving door” that allows politicians to shuttle between public and private sector work.

Salazar served as Colorado’s Attorney General, U.S. Senator and Interior Secretary before traveling through that revolving door and taking a job in 2013 as a partner at WilmerHale — a law and lobbying colossus that has been called one of the most influential forces in Washington.

Salazar’s biography says that he “provides legal, strategic and policy advice to national and international clients, particularly on matters at the intersection of law, business and public policy.” He is one of 39 former public officials now working at WilmerHale, according to the nonpartisan Center for Responsive Politics.

The firm has recently been the subject of a ProPublica investigation that showed one of its partners gave a personal loan to Gene Sperling, then President Obama’s economic adviser, as the firm represented major financial institutions.

Salazar is not a registered lobbyist but he appears to fit the description of the kind of powerbroker that Clinton has criticized.

Promoting new ethics legislation in 2015, she published an op-ed with Wisconsin Sen. Tammy Baldwin declaring that “ increasingly, Americans’ trust in government is eroding,” and saying “a big reason for that is the so-called revolving door between government and the private sector.”

The op-ed added: “loopholes allow former government officials to lobby in practice, even if they aren’t officially called lobbyists.

They offer regulatory access to private interests as ‘outside advisors’ or ‘strategic counselors.’ That means they can avoid legal requirements that lobbyists have to meet. This bill would clamp down on that.”

Salazar will lead a transition team that includes former Michigan Gov. Jennifer Granholm, Center for American Progress President Neera Tanden and former White House National Security Adviser Tom Donilon.

The latter is a former mortgage industry lobbyist who is now a partner specializing in "public policy and political strategy" at a major corporate law firm in Washington.



Source:


Hillary Clinton Appoints Ken Salazar To Lead White House Transition






In English and U.S. Law

Defamation is Nearly Always A Tort

Not A Crime

Defamation (Üble Nachrede: Die üble Nachrede nach § 186 Strafgesetzbuch (StGB) ist eine Art von Ehrdelikt.[3]Robert D. Sack: "Sack of Defamation" gives you the latest insight into how the law of defamation.[6]



MMarks, Transblawg


6 September 2012




I know the purpose of a weblog is to spread sunshine and light rather than criticizing other people’s work. But I must comment on a German criminal law weblog’s suggestion of learning English criminal-law terminology. [1][2]

Here’s what I wrote on Beleidigung in 2003:

In English and U.S. law, defamation is nearly always a tort, not a crime. It consists, loosely speaking, in communicating to a third party some fact about the victim that tends to lower his or her reputation among right-thinking people.[1][2]

If the fact is true, that is a complete defence. Thus, three people are needed. One form, libel, is in permanent form (often writing), and the other, slander, is not.[1][2]

In German law, there is also defamation, and the word Diffamierung can be used. The two forms of defamation differ in seriousness, but both can be either permanent or impermanent, in speech or in writing. To distinguish them, therefore, libel and slander won’t do.[1][2]

These two offences (üble Nachrede and Verleumdung) are part of a group of offences headed Beleidigung. [1]

These offences also include insult, for which only two people are needed, and a form of assault – if you indicate your disrespect for someone by spitting in their face, this is also covered, and I am calling it assault, although the problem with that is that the English reader may not realize its connection to insult. There are a couple of other offences, such as insulting the dead.[1]



Freedom 101.2; Ep. 11:
New York Times v. Sullivan




How, then, to translate the heading Beleidigung? I used to ask my students this question with the example of a list of crime statistics. My answer would have been Insult, assault and defamation.[1][2]

Now, in the crime statistics summary, I find Insult, assault and battery. That is very good, but what has happened to the defamation? It has completely disappeared.[1][2]

In the Federal Ministry of Justice’s translation of the Criminal Code (via German Law Archive), the heading for the group of offences is the misleading Insult, üble Nachrede is translated as malicious gossip (whereas it can be in writing or oral) and Verleumdung as defamation (which applies equally to both terms).[1][2]



50 Years Later:
The New York Times v. Sullivan




Die üble Nachrede nach § 186 Strafgesetzbuch (StGB) ist eine Art von Ehrdelikt, das sich von der Beleidigung (§ 185 StGB) dadurch unterscheidet, dass nicht die Äußerung eines bestimmten negativen Werturteils unter Strafe gestellt wird, sondern das Behaupten oder Verbreiten ehrenrühriger Tatsachen.[3]

Eine Tatsachenbehauptung liegt vor, wenn die Äußerung in ihrem Gehalt einer objektiven Klärung offensteht und damit dem Beweis zugänglich ist. Hierzu zählen nicht nur so genannte „äußere Tatsachen“, sondern auch „innere Tatsachen“ (beispielsweise die Absicht, eine Straftat zu begehen).[3]

Für die Strafbarkeit wegen übler Nachrede ist entscheidend, dass die Tatsachenbehauptung „nicht erweislich wahr“ ist, d. h. kein Wahrheitsbeweis vorliegt. [3]

Ist die Tatsachenbehauptung hingegen „erweislich unwahr“ und weiß der Täter um deren Unwahrheit, so handelt es sich nicht um eine (vermeintliche) üble Nachrede, sondern um eine Verleumdung nach § 187 StGB.[3]

Die Verleumdung ist rechtsdogmatisch eine Qualifikation zur üblen Nachrede.[3]


Wer in Beziehung auf einen anderen eine Tatsache behauptet oder verbreitet, welche denselben verächtlich zu machen oder in der öffentlichen Meinung herabzuwürdigen geeignet ist, wird, wenn nicht diese Tatsache erweislich wahr ist, mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu einem Jahr oder mit Geldstrafe und, wenn die Tat öffentlich oder durch Verbreiten von Schriften (§ 11 Abs. 3) begangen ist, mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu zwei Jahren oder mit Geldstrafe bestraft.[4]

Strafgesetzbuch: Besonderer Teil (§§ 80 - 358), 14. Abschnitt - Beleidigung (§§ 185 - 200) [4]






"Beleidigung,
üble Nachrede, Verleumdung"
| Ehrschutzdelikte auf Facebook |
Kanzlei WBS




Üble Nachrede

Oder

Verleumdung?



Was üble Nachrede und Verleumdung genau bedeuten, ist im Straf­ge­setzbuch (StGB) verankert. Nach § 186 StGB wird von übler Nachrede gesprochen, wenn über eine Person Tatsachen behauptet und verbreitet werden, die nachweislich als unwahr heraus­ge­stellt werden können.[5]

Im Unter­schied zum Gerücht ist die Nachrede deutlich aggressiver und diffa­mie­render. Die behaupteten Tatsachen sind entweder verächtlich oder haben negative Konse­quenzen für den Betroffenen in der Öffent­lichkeit. Im Streitfall hilft ein Rechts­schutz weiter.[5]



Falsche Anschuldigungen




Paragraf 187 StGB bildet wiederum den gesetz­lichen Rahmen für die Verleumdung. Auch in diesem Fall werden unwahre, ehren­rührige Aussagen über eine Person getätigt. [5]

Im Unter­schied zur üblen Nachrede ist sich der Verleumder jedoch der Unwahrheit seiner verächt­lichen Aussagen gegenüber Dritten bewusst und hat sie nicht etwa nur von einer anderen Person erfahren, ohne den Wahrheits­gehalt zu kennen.[5]



Rechtschutz für Whistleblower
- EuGH für Menschenrechte



Torts lecture:
Introduction to Common Law Defamation
| quimbee.com





Defamation

Involves

A False Statement

That Defames Or Harms

 Another Person’s Reputation

The disputed statement also must have a defamatory meaning -- that is, it must be capable of harming a person’s reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person.[7]



Robert C. Clothier, Esquire*


June 16-19, 2004





Defamation involves a false statement that defames or harms another person’s reputation. Defamatory statements are categorized as “libel” or “slander.” [7]

“Libel” is written or visual defamation, and “slander” is spoken or oral defamation. Generally speaking, it is more difficult to make out a cause of action for slander than for libel, on the view that written defamation is far more damaging than oral. [7]

Defamation consists of the following elements: (1) false statement of fact; (2) capable of a defamatory meaning; (3) of and concerning another living person; (4) publication to a third party; (5) some degree of fault on the part of the person making the statement; and (6) harm to the reputation of the person defamed. [7]

Even if a defamation plaintiff is able to establish these elements, the defendant might be able to show that the communication was privileged. If so, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show an abuse of privilege. [7]

Although these elements are simply stated, they are difficult to apply largely because so much of the law of defamation has been “constitutionalized” by relatively recent Supreme Court precedent. [7]

As a result, these elements;will vary depending on the identity of the plaintiff and the defendant, the nature of the allegedly defamatory statement and the jurisdiction whose law applies. See generally Rodney A. Smolla, LAW OF DEFAMATION (2nd Ed. 2003); Robert D. Sack, SACK ON DEFAMATION (3rd Ed. 1999).[7]

This outline will first summarize these basic principles of defamation and then analyze cases involving typical defamation scenarios in the higher education context.[7]

A. Elements of Defamation Law



1. False Statement of Fact The first element of defamation is a false statement of fact.[7]

There must be a statement, which may be verbal or visual. Although signs or symbols may qualify as communications, see Smolla, supra, § 4.30, actions will not necessarily be construed as forms of defamatory communication.[7]

 See, e.g., Hicks v. Stone, 425 So.2d 807 (La. Ct. App. 1982), writ. denied, 429 So.2d 129 (La. 1983) (board action in firing a dean was not itself a published “statement”). [7]

The statement must be false. If a statement is in fact true, no defamation action may be advanced, no matter how defamatory the statement is. [7]

In some jurisdictions, however, a literally true statement could be actionable if it carries a false implication. [7]

See generally Sack, supra, § 3.8; see, e.g., Campanelli v. University of California, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 891 (Ct. App. 1996) (athletic director’s statements about terminated basketball coach were substantially true); Wynne v. Loyola University of Chicago, 741 N.E.2d 669 (Ill.App. 2000) (statements made by dean about professor in memorandum sent to senior member of department were “substantially true”); Williams v. University of Cincinnati, 752 N.E.2d 367 (Ct.Clms. Ohio 2001) (university’s statements to NCAA about college basketball player student were true); Hupp v. Sasser, 490 S.E.2d 880 (Va. 1997) (certain of statements made by university dean about former graduate student (e.g., that he was the subject of multiple complaints) were true); Collins v. Martinez, 709 F.Supp. 311 (D.P.R. 1989), aff’d., 894 F.2d 474 (1st Cir. 1990) (largely true statements to agencies regarding alleged unprofessional conduct in research were non-actionable); Keddie v. Penn. State Univ., 412 F.Supp. 1264 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (statements about plaintiff’s academic performance and tenure denial were “in effect” true). [7]


Slander & Defamation
Can You Afford to Sue?



The disputed statement must also express or imply an assertion of fact rather than opinion. In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment permits defamation actions under state law only where a communication states or implies actual facts.[7]

The Milkovich Court nonetheless declined to accord statements of opinion any constitutionally-based “privilege.” See generally Smolla, supra, ch. 6, esp. §§ 6:15-6:27; Sack, supra, § 4.2.4. [7]

Merely couching an assertion of fact as an opinion – e.g., “it is my opinion that the professor stole money” -- will not render the statement protected. [7]

So long as a statement explicitly or implicitly makes assertions that are provably true or false, it is a statement of fact that can form the basis of a defamation claim. An opinion, on the other hand, reflects a speaker’s subjective view and attitude towards people or events. [7]

For example, to say that plaintiff, a college basketball coach, “usually finds a way to screw up” is protected opinion. [7] people or events. [7]

Washington v. Smith, 893 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1995), aff’d, 80 F.3d. 555 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Similarly, it is opinion to refer to the university’s vice president of student affairs as the “Director of Butt Licking.” Yeagle v. Collegiate Times, 255 Va. 293, 497 S.E. 2d 136 (1998). [7] people or events. [7]

Vigorous epithets, name calling, rhetorical hyperbole and satire are particular types of opinions that are protected even though they may sometimes, on their face, appear to state facts (e.g., to call someone “insane” or “paranoid” can be either a statement of fact or merely an epithet). See generally Smolla, supra, § 6:90; Sack, supra, § 4.3.3. [6] people or events. [7]

As a matter of constitutional law, the party who bears the burden of proving falsity is almost always the plaintiff. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). But the common law rule that falsity was presumed and truth an affirmative defense remains in some private figure cases in some jurisdictions.[7]


TAWBAH: Slander and wrongdoings,
how are we judged?





2.Capable of a Defamatory Meaning

The disputed statement also must have a defamatory meaning -- that is, it must be capable of harming a person’s reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person. A statement can be defamatory on its face (e.g., calling a student a “liar” or a “thief”), or it can imply a defamatory meaning. [7]

Thus, a statement that is, on its face, not defamatory is nonetheless actionable if the defamatory implication or innuendo becomes reasonably apparent with the addition of other facts, whether contained in the publication itself or otherwise known to the reader or listener. See Smolla, supra, §§ 4.16-19; Sack, supra, § 2.4.5. [7]




*The author acknowledges and extends his appreciation to Francine Tilewick Bazluke, whose NACUA pamphlet “Defamation Issues in Higher Education” provided the foundation for this manuscript.[6]



News Conference
- NCCM Announces Libel Notice
against Prime Minister's Office




In 1976, Alfred Hill examined the impact of then-recent Supreme Court defamation and privacy decisions. Although Hill shared widespread anticipation of continued expansive case-law development by the Court, there was surprisingly little thereafter, leaving Hill's analysis timely twenty-fours years later. Judge Sack now revisits and evaluates First Amendment protection for opinion and the Hill article's treatment of the subject.[8] [8]


NCCM Sues Prime Minister's Office of Canada





Federal judges Robert Sack ’60 and Lewis Kaplan ’66 help decide some of the nation’s most visible court cases

Robert D. Sack has been a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit since August 6, 1998. [10]The new rules required plaintiffs to support their claims with proof of “actual malice." (Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80)[11] They provided that “actual malice” must be established by clear and convincing evidence (Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80) and that a defendant was entitled to independent appellate review of any trial court finding to that effect ( Sullivan, 376 U.S.at 285 n.26.) [11]



David McKay Wilson

Robert Sack ’60 and Lewis Kaplan ’66 are used to getting a lot of attention for their opinions.[9]

The two Manhattan-based federal judges—Sack, who sits on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Manhattan; Kaplan, a judge in the federal system’s Southern District of New York—have put their imprint on some of the nation’s highest profile court cases.[9]

And while their roles in the court system differ—as an appellate judge, Sack helps decide whether trial court rulings should stand; as a trial judge, Kaplan presides over the presentation of evidence and arguments from plaintiffs and defendants—both say they enjoy the intellectual challenges presented by complex litigation and untangling thorny legal issues.[9]

“I don’t have a client other than the people of the United States,” says Kaplan, who was the 2007 commencement speaker for the Department of Political Science. “I don’t have to espouse anybody’s cause, so I’m independent to do the right thing. There is no greater luxury.”[9]

Says Sack: “As a judge, you become a generalist again. Instead of being committed to a narrow area, you are constantly learning law that’s new to you. In that way, the work is very, very invigorating. I almost had to start all over again to learn a new trade, based on an old discipline.”[9]

From their separate courtrooms in the federal courthouse at 500 Pearl Street in lower Manhattan, the two Rochester graduates are helping answer some of the fundamental—and topical—questions about how the legal system works.[9]

Such questions as, Can U.S. officials apprehend foreign nationals and turn them over to other countries, a concept known as “extraordinary rendition” and purportedly used by the administration of President George Bush to combat terror?

In a 46-page dissent from a three-member appeals court panel last year, Sack argued that U.S. government officials had “outsourced” torture when they detained a Canadian man at JFK International Airport and later sent him to Syria.[9]

In December, the full 12-member appeals court reheard arguments in the case of Maher Arar, an “en banc” re-hearing of an already decided case that’s rare in the federal system. It’s all the more unusual because neither the defendant nor the U.S. government requested the second hearing.[9]

Meanwhile, Kaplan presided at the trial of former KPMG employees accused of conspiracy to defraud the United States and of tax evasion by selling illegal tax shelters that cost the U.S. Treasury at least $2 billion. In April, he sentenced three defendants to prison sentences ranging from 78 months to 121 months.[9]

His earlier rulings in the case have forced federal prosecutors to reexamine their tactics in such cases. Their appointments as judges are the culmination of legal careers that each built before being tapped for their lifetime posts by President Bill Clinton.[9]

Kaplan, who practiced commercial litigation at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, was confirmed by the Senate in 1994. In 1998, Sack, one of the nation’s foremost experts on First Amendment law, was practicing with Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher when he was named to the appellate court.[9]

Sack, who grew up in Brooklyn, traveled north to Rochester for college, open to where a liberal arts education would lead him. Kaplan enrolled at Rochester from Staten Island to study the sciences. He was pre-med, in part to fulfill his father’s dream that his son become a doctor. Kaplan majored in chemistry for three years, but in his last year, pulled together enough courses to earn a degree in political science.[9]

He applied to medical and law schools. He won acceptance at both. “Ultimately, it came down to this: Was it my father’s career or mine?” says Kaplan, who attended Harvard Law School. “Law was what I wanted to do, and that’s what I did.”[9]

After graduation from Rochester, Sack went on to Columbia School of Law, where he earned his degree and where he now teaches First Amendment law.[9]

Now friends, the paths of the future judges didn’t intersect on the River Campus. They met while both were in private practice in New York. Kaplan was raising money for the University and called on Sack to contribute.[9]

“The first happy thing I recall when Lewis became a judge was that he couldn’t hit me up for money anymore,” quips Sack.[9]

As a prominent First Amendment lawyer, Sack is the author of Sack on Defamation: Libel, Slander and Related Problems, his 1979 book that is celebrating its 30th anniversary in print this year.[9]

Sack, who clerked for a federal judge after graduating from law school, began his legal career at Patterson, Belknap & Webb.[9]

In 1974, he took a leave to serve as senior associate special counsel to the House Judiciary Committee, which was preparing the case to impeach then President Richard Nixon. Working alongside Sack was a young lawyer just out of Yale Law School named Hillary Rodham. Also on the team was attorney Bernard Nussbaum, who later became counsel to President Clinton.[9]

Nussbaum called in 1996 to ask if Sack would be interested in a federal appointment. “Bernie called me out of the blue asking me if I was interested,” he says. “I asked my wife, she said yes, and the rest is hysteria.”[9]

As an appeals judge, Sack usually sits on a panel of three judges, hearing about 250 cases a year. He writes full opinions on about 25—roughly one every two weeks.[9]

His dissent in the case of Maher Arar— who says that U.S. government officials are responsible for sending him to Syria, where he claims he was tortured—attracted nationwide attention last June. [9]

Sack was on the losing side of a 2–1 decision that rejected Arar’s lawsuit, but he was troubled by the treatment of the Canadian, who was apprehended at JFK airport on his way home from a vacation in Tunisia when authorities saw his name on a Canadian terrorist watch-list.[9]

A Canadian commission in 2006 found that Arar’s name was mistakenly on the list. Canada issued an apology, and paid him $9.75 million.[9]

“The defendants did not themselves torture Arar, they outsourced it,” wrote Sack. “But I do not think that whether the defendants violated Arar’s Fifth Amendment rights turns on whom they selected to do the torturing: themselves, a Syrian Intelligence officer, a warlord in Somalia, a drug cartel in Colombia, a military contractor in Baghdad or Boston, a Mafia family in New Jersey, or a Crip set in South Los Angeles.”



Bill Cosby's Attorney
Speaks Out On Defamation Lawsuit
| MSNBC





Like Sack, Kaplan clerked for a year with a federal judge before landing a job at a top Manhattan firm.[9]

His scientific background serves him well on the bench, where he has presided over major cases involving patents and the pharmaceutical industry. He currently serves on the Southern District’s technology committee, studying new methods to manage the vast amounts of data involved in federal cases.[9]

One of Kaplan’s highest profile proceedings, the KPMG case began in 2006, when the firm admitted criminal wrongdoing and paid $456 million in penalties. That same year, 16 former KPMG employees were indicted in the scheme.[9]

Kaplan dismissed charges against 13 of the former employees, ruling that the government improperly pressured KPMG not to pay the legal fees of its employees, denying their right to counsel.[9]

“This is intolerable in a society that holds itself out to the world as a paragon of justice,” Kaplan wrote. [9]

The trial took two months, a challenge Kaplan says he was ready for. “You have to pace yourself in a trial that long,” he says. “It takes a lot of energy. I keep alert by taking notes. I’m a compulsive note-taker and it keeps my head in the game.”[9]



Prominently, lastly, and of course, there were actions under English common law of libel and slander. [11]

It was New York Times v. Sullivan that began to outline the limitations on the use of these actions to quash unpopular speech about public figures, public men and women, and—to some extent—public affairs.[11]

It is to Sullivan, then, that we now turn—recognizing it as, among other things, part of this arc of emerging Supreme Court jurisprudence that served to protect free speech and free press from ancient English common law and statutory tools of suppression.[11]



Defamation is a malicious and false claim that comes in two varieties, slander (an oral statement) and libel (a written statement). [12]

Both have the potential of harming the reputation of an individual or business and exposing the person or company to ridicule, hatred, or financial loss. [12]

Penalties for both libel and slander are similar, although libel tends to be easier to prove since documentary evidence exists in the written words, while, in the case of slander, one or more individuals may be required to recall what was said, and memory can be imperfect. [12]



Torts lecture:
Privileges and Defenses to Defamation |
quimbee.com




DOES LIABILITY


ENHANCE CREDIBILITY?


LESSONS FROM THE DMCA APPLIED TO ONLINE DEFAMATION



OLIVERA MEDENICA & KAISER WAHAB






The law of defamation has evolved as a tug-of-war between a plaintiff’s right to enjoy his reputation and a defendant’s right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment. [13]

In defamation proceedings, an injured plaintiff seeks redress for statements that are false and harmful to his reputation, against a defendant’s assertion that his statements are truthful. [13]

If the tort appears deceptively simple, it is because the terms “truth” and “fault” are generally familiar.[13]

Fundamental to a stable and democratic society is the protection of free speech, but only to the extent that such protection does not eviscerate the equally critical right to one’s reputation and privacy.[13]

Collectively these and other legal instruments illustrate the fact that defamation law is not an aberrant and mildly tolerated limitation on free speech. [13]

It is a legal framework effectuating the need to balance the right to expression with individual rights. [13]

A defamation case is therefore rarely a simple matter, and as will be discussed in greater detail below, modern technology and the Internet only add to the complexity of this already complicated analysis.[13]


Freedom of Speech

Defamation & Injunctions




WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW



David S. Ardia



Vol. 55:001, 2013



It has long been a fixture of Anglo-American law that libel plaintiffs are not entitled to injunctive relief; their remedies are solely monetary.[14]


For example, in Citizens’ Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Montgomery Light & Water Power Co., the court refused to enjoin a libel and stated:[14]



Defendant has a right to have the truth or falsity of the issue determined by a jury trial as at common law. [15]

That it cannot get in a court of equity. A person cannot be enjoined from doing any act unless it is fairly apparent the act is wrongful, or the person sought to be enjoined has no right to do that act. [15]

How can a court of equity be satisfied where the right lays in the matter of the alleged false statements? It cannot try the question for itself, or determine the right in advance of the law court. [15]

B. Constitutional Limitations on Injunctive Relief. [14]


Because an injunction directed at defamatory speech necessarily involves a judicial order that is intended to either stop speech before it is published or preclude its further dissemination, injunctions raise significant First Amendment concerns. [16]

Indeed, in the vast majority of cases in which courts have considered granting an injunction directed at defamatory speech, they refuse to do so on the basis that the injunction would be an unconstitutional prior restraint. [WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:001, 2013; p.31 (134)][16]


The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution:Robert C. Post. [17]

The common law of defamation has long been viewed as an intellectual wasteland, "perplexed with minute and barren distinctions." (F. POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 243 (13th ed. 1929).[17]

Dean Prosser, for example, began his discussion of the law of defamation with the proposition, which he took to be incontestable, that "there is a great deal of the law of defamation which makes no sense," in that it contains "anomalies and absurdities for which no legal writer ever has had a kind word."(W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 737 (4th ed. 1971).[17]


It was with considerable relief, therefore, that in 1964 legal commentators turned their attention to the difficult and fascinating constitutional questions raised by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,(376 U.S. 254 ,1964)) which for the first time subjected the law of defamation to the regulation of the first amendment. Discussion of the law of defamation has been dominated ever since by the constitutional perspective.[18]



Will there be chaos
without criminal defamation laws?





Üble Nachrede (§ 186 StGB) und Verleumdung (§ 187 StGB)



Die Tatbestände der üblen Nachrede (§ 186 StGB) und Verleumdung (§ 187 StGB) erfassen - im Gegensatz zur Beleidigung - ehrenrührige Tatsachen über eine Person, die aber nicht dieser gegenüber, sondern einem oder mehreren Dritten gegenüber geäußert werden. In den Fällen der üblen Nachrede oder der Verleumdung liegt also immer ein Mehrpersonenverhältnis vor.[19]

Der Unterschied zwischen beiden Delikten besteht darin, dass dem Täter bei der Verleumdung nach § 187 StGB die Unwahrheit der ehrenrührigen Tatsachenbehauptung positiv bekannt sein muss. Bei § 186 StGB kann der Täter dagegen durchaus von der Wahrheit der behaupteten Tatsache ausgehen; eine Strafbarkeit wegen übler Nachrede gemäß § 186 StGB entfällt jedoch nur dann, wenn sich die vermeintliche ehrenrührige Tatsache später vor Gericht als zutreffend herausstellt.[19]


üblen Nachrede und Verleumdung unter Strafe stellt. Nach dieser Vorschrift wird bestraft, wer öffentlich oder durch das Verbreiten von Schriften einer im politischen Leben des Volkes stehende Person übel nachredet oder diese verleumdet, sofern dies aus Motiven heraus geschieht, die mit der Stellung des Betroffenen zu tun hat.[19]

Das Strafmaß beträgt bei der üblen Nachrede Freiheitsstrafe bis zu zwei Jahren oder Geldstrafe, bei der Verleumdung Freiheitsstrafe bis zu fünf Jahre oder Geldstrafe und bei § 188 StGB maximal Freiheitsstrafe bis zu fünf Jahren. Zum Problem der Wahrnehmung berechtigter Interessen siehe hier.[19]


The Big Picture -
SC upholds criminal defamation:
Effect on free speech



Üble Nachrede ist ein Spezialfall der Beleidigung (§ 185 StGB). Sie besteht dann, wenn jemand über einen anderen Menschen nachweislich unwahre Tatsachen behauptet, die diesen verächtlich machen und in der öffentlichen Meinung herabwürdigen. Wer wegen übler Nachrede verurteilt wird, muss nach § 186 StGB mit Freiheitsstrafen bis zu zwei Jahren oder mit einer Geldstrafe rechnen. [20]

Üble Nachrede oder Verleumdung bestehen übrigens nicht nur dann, wenn jemand selbst strafbare Dinge behauptet (sich also damit identifiziert). Auch das Verbreiten und Zitieren solcher Behauptungen ist strafbar. Darunter fällt also auch virtueller Klatsch und Tratsch. [20]



Bryson Kern


REPUTATIONAL INJURY WITHOUT A REPUTATIONAL ATTACK: ADDRESSING NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS FOR PURE REPUTATIONAL HARM.[21]




How Your Business Can Be Defamed -
Brian Radnoff






U.S. rejects asylum to Turkey's NATO base commander suspected of complicity in coup bid




Unian.info


18 July 2016



The commander of the Incirlik airbase arrested for plotting the failed military coup in Turkey has sought asylum from the United States but was denied, The Daily Sabah reported citing the New York Times.[22]

General Bekir Ercan Van approached U.S. officials seeking asylum but was refused, a person with knowledge of the matter who spoke anonymously because of the sensitive nature of the subject said, according to The Daily Sabah. [22]

Air force brigadier general Bekir Ercan Van was detained at the key Incirlik air base used by U.S. forces for raids in Syria, along with a dozen lower-ranked officers. [22]

The suspects are being charged with "membership in an armed terrorist organization" and "attempting to overthrow the government of the Turkish Republic using force and violence or attempting to completely or partially hinder its function."[22]

On Friday night, renegade elements within Turkey's military attempted to stage a coup against the government.[22]

Although the coup was soon put down by the country's legitimate authorities and security apparatus, some 161 people were killed in the violence, according to Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım.[22]

Over 3,000 military personnel, including high-ranking masterminds of the coup, have been detained and detention warrants have been issued for 2.475 judges and prosecutors.[22]





Russian proxies attack ATO forces 52 times in last 24 hours, use heavy weapons



UNIAN.Info




17 August 2016




Combined Russian-separatist forces attacked Ukrainian army positions in eastern Ukraine 52 times in the past 24 hours, including 23 times in the Donetsk sector, 20 times in the Mariupol sector and nine times in the Luhansk sector, according to the press center of the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) Headquarters.[23]

The situation in the Donbas conflict zone remains tense but controlled. In flagrant violation of the Minsk agreements, the militants intensified their activity along the entire demarcation line, the ATO HQ said in an update as of 06:00 Kyiv time on August 17. [

"In the Mariupol sector, the enemy launched 60 shells from the 122mm artillery systems on the village of Chermalyk, as well as fired large-caliber guns on the village of Novoselivka and the town of Maryinka.[23]

The militants used 152mm artillery systems in the village of Rybynske. They fired mortars in the town of Krasnohorivka, and the villages of Slavne, Lebedynske, Chermalyk and Shyrokyne. [23]

The occupiers fired from infantry fighting vehicles in the village of Novohryhorivka and the town of Maryinka. A sniper was active in this direction," the press center said.[23]

In the Donetsk sector, the situation was most tense in the town of Avdiyivka, and the villages of Zaitseve, Maiorsk and Luhanske, where the enemy fired 120mm and 82mm mortars, grenade launchers of various systems and heavy machine guns on the Ukrainian fortified positions. [23]

It was also restless in the villages of Verkhniotoretske, Kamianka, Novoselivka Druha and Novhorodske. "Russia's hybrid military force fired 122mm artillery systems on the Ukrainian positions in the village of Vrubivka in Luhansk region.[23]

They used different types of grenade launchers on the Ukrainian fortified positions in the villages of Stanytsia Luhanska, Novo-Oleksandrivka, and the town of Popasna," the headquarters said. In addition, the Russian-backed mercenaries fired from infantry fighting vehicles in Popasna. The enemy does not stop armed provocations with the use of small arms. A sniper pair was active in Novo-Oleksandrіvka and Stanytsia Luhanska.[23]










Nagorno-Karabakh


Isn't Disputed Territory


It's Occupied

Kamal Makili-Aliyev








May 10, 2016





It's actually very simple. Contrary to the statements made in the mass media when it covers the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, this mountainous region of Azerbaijan is not disputed in any way; it is occupied.[24]

So says the international judicial body the European Court of Human Rights.[24]

 Despite the allegations of Armenia (that have in fact occupied sovereign territory of Azerbaijan) that the remaining ethnically Armenian population of the region has exercised the right to self-determination, it has been proven false again and again. [24]

For once, Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh are not "people" in the sense of rights that are provided by a UN Charter. [24]

Armenians have already exercised that right in Armenia, where they have an internationally recognized state. Thus, making them a national minority on the territory of Azerbaijan and not "Nagorno-Karabakh people".[24]

Otherwise, Armenians would have a right to self-determination in U.S., Russia, France and other countries where they have large communities, creating a horde of small states. This is simply illogical.[24]

No state, including Armenia, has recognized the separatist entity in Nagorno-Karabakh, nor has Armenia laid claim to it. So there is no dispute on the attribution of the region, and the European Court of Human Rights has actually incorporated these facts into international jurisprudence. [24]

On June 16, 2015 Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights passed two judgments on the reciprocal cases Chiragov and Others v. Armenia and Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan.[24]

Both cases seemed to have very close and even balanced judgments and that Court intended not to stir political side of the dispute. [24]

However, closer examination shows that this is far from reality and it was impossible for the Court to escape some very serious issues related to the status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh.[24]

For example, in the Chiragov v. Armenia case, Court addresses the separatist entity "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic" specifically to show that it is not in any way recognized officially.[24]

It also establishes the fact that there are no Azerbaijanis left in the occupied territories of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast as well as in the adjacent seven regions, essentially acknowledging that Armenians could legally to carry out complete ethnic cleansing within those territories.[24]

Those ethnic cleansings resulted in around 750,000 internally displaced persons living in Azerbaijan now and additional 250,000 refugees of Azerbaijani origin expelled from Armenia itself.[24]

Moreover, the Court recognizes Armenian military and financial control over so-called "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic" and comes to the opinion that Armenia has “effective control” in Nagorno-Karabakh.[24]

Thus, Armenia have been found in violation of the corresponding articles in the aforementioned case, due to the effective control it has over Nagorno-Karabakh. [24]

So if one state has a "effective control" over the recognized territory of the other state, there cannot be any doubt that the state is occupied; thus, there cannot be any dispute over the attribution of the Nagorno-Karabakh region.[24]

 Occupation of someone's sovereign territory does not make that territory disputed in anyway.[24]

The conflict itself being a territorial dispute can be resolved. Ethnic complications can be resolved if the right attitude is employed.[24]

The rights of the Armenian minority to culture, language and religion can be guaranteed without violation of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. [24]

Armenians can be equal citizens of Azerbaijan enjoying minority rights and enjoy autonomy. Azerbaijanis have already expressed this proposal many times through its government.[24]

However, mass media is somehow twisting the real discourse and disregarding all of the international legal data on the subject in an attempt to be "neutral" when reporting on the conflict.[24]

However, neutrality does not necessarily mean objectivity. And objectivity is what the image of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict really lacks today. [24]

So the discourse that mass media shapes now, instead of playing in favor of conflict resolution actually helps the hostilities escalate.[24]

If the mass media continues to shape its "neutral" discourse and does not lean on the facts, it will only embolden the Armenia's position of staying on their grounds of occupation and preservation of status quo.[24]

This destructive stance on violence as opposed to the compromise would allow Armenia to ensure the rights of its minority in Azerbaijan as true caring kin-state. [24]

As American author and renowned though Bryant McGill very astutely points out: "Where wise actions are the fruit of life, wise discourse is the pollination.” [24]

In order for the resolution of the conflict to bring some fruits, the discourse should first of all turn to the wise one.[24]

 While the Nagorno-Karabakh is not a disputed region of Azerbaijan, the discourse around it should become the subject to a very profound change.[24]

Dr. habil. Kamal Makili-Aliyev is a Leading Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies (SAM) in Azerbaijan. [24]

He is an expert in international law and conflict resolution. He is a graduate of Lund University (Sweden) and previously worked for Ministry of Defense and Constitutional Court of Azerbaijan.[24]


Link:

Alexander Petersen: Nagorno-Karabakh:
Russia's Proxy War in the Caucasus




Nagorno-Karabakh:





Russia's




Proxy War




 In the Caucasus











Alexander Petersen



30 December 2013




Armenia's defense arsenal is procured from Russia, and Moscow provides major discounts forthe dependent nation. These arms go both to Armenian regular forces and the militias active in the conflict zone.[25]

Additionally, Armenia’s economy is almost entirely dependent on Russian investment, and all large enterprises in the country are controlled by Russian firms with ties to the Kremlin. [25]

More than 80% of Armenia’s energy infrastructure is owned by Russian companies and the government owes Russia enormous debts, incurred from natural gas and arms sales.[25]

Remittances from abroad are crucial to Armenia’s economic welfare, and a major portion of these comes from Armenians working in Russia.[25]

 Given Moscow’s proclivity to deport foreign nationals for geopolitical reasons (as occurred with Georgians during the 2008 war), the fate of Armenian workers in Russia is a major source of leverage.[25]

So, how is this a proxy war?[25]

Russian assistance is the main reason for Armenian control over Karabkh and its surrounding regions.[25]

This comes in the form of a treaty guaranteeing Russian defense of Armenia in case of conflict, which is compounded by a number of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) obligations that tie the two countries together, primarily ensuring that Russia could work closely with, and even command, Armenian regular forces.[25]

On the ground, this is underpinned by Russia’s major military base at Gyumri. [25]

The 102nd Military Base, leftover from Soviet times, keeps 5,000 troops armed with tanks, artillery, helicopters, MiG-29 aircraft and Iskender-M tactical ballistic missiles ready to support Armenian forces and to serve as a deterrent against any Azerbaijani plan to retake the territory.[25]

Armenian forces receive training at the Russian base and the militaries of the two countries conduct regular exercises together. Russian officers inspect Armenian positions and provide tactical advice.[25]

In October 2013, Col. Andrey Ruzinsky, commander of the Gyumri base, stated in an interview with an official Russian media outlet that Russian forces are prepared to intervene should the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict heat up again. [25]

In a show of how important the base is to Russia, when Vladimir Putin visited Armenia recently, he spent more time at Gyumri than in Yerevan, Armenia’s capital. He also declared that Russia will increase its influence in the South Caucasus this year.[25]

Interestingly, Russia also sells arms to Azerbaijan and maintains cordial relations with Baku.[25]

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfer database, Russia sold Azerbaijan $1 billion dollars’ worth of weapons from 2007 to 2012, with another major sale this year.[25]

This is a telltale sign of the interesting balance that Moscow seeks to maintain in this conflict.[25]

By simmering along in a violent, but tolerable (for Russia) state, creating a gaping chasm of instability in the middle of the South Caucasus, Russia achieves a number of strategic aims without direct intervention:

it pressures Western-oriented and energy-rich Azerbaijan, ensuring that despite its growing independence of policy, Russia holds a hammer above its head;

and it provides an important ace up Russia’s sleeve to menace European energy and transport projects, mostly oil and gas pipelines that snake from the Caspian Sea through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey to the EU.[25]

Russia also holds the key to conflict settlement.[25]

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe maintains a conflict negotiation mechanism, the Minsk Group, which is meant to facilitate discussions between the belligerent sides and oversee the implementation of a peace agreement.[25]

The international co-chairs of this group, however, are the United States, France, and Russia, meaning that a party to the conflict and the major geopolitical impetus behind it is also officially recognized as a mediator. [25]

It is perhaps not surprising that the Minsk Group has achieved little in almost two decades.[25]

For Russia, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a low-cost, low-effort proxy war yielding geopolitical returns.[25]

The conflict helps Russia to indirectly pressure Azerbaijan, the EU, NATO, and the United States, as well as to maintain a hand in the economies and major infrastructure projects of the region. [25]

Russia’s security commitments to Armenia and capabilities in the region mean that Moscow may have to make good on its commitments at some point in the future, but for the moment, as the region suffers continuing instability, Russia gains continued clout amongst its neighbors.[25]

Most of all, Moscow holds the power to put a cork in the strategic bottleneck of the Caucasus between Russia and Iran, blocking Western access to Central Asia and Afghanistan.[25]

What, if anything, can the United States and its allies do to ameliorate this dilemma? [25]

As Minsk Group co-chairs, the U.S. and France (representing the EU) can cease to play the polite diplomatic game that requires treating Russia as if it were an impartial mediator. [25]

A public acknowledgment of Russia’s active role as a party to the conflict would not only clarify various interests involved, but also expose Moscow on the international stage in such a way as to potentially elicit a shift in its posture. [25]

Were U.S. and European diplomats to publicly call out Russia on Nagorno-Karabakh, it may begin to tip the Kremlin’s cost-benefit calculus.[25]

This should go hand-in-hand with a renewed effort towards holding comprehensive negotiations. The Obama administration is in fact very well suited to tackle the thorny Karabakh conflict. [25]

The current U.S. co-chair of the Minsk Group, Ambassador James Warlick, is one of the most senior diplomats to hold the position, and he brings extensive experience negotiating with Afghan leaders on security agreements.[25]

Secretary of State John Kerry is intimately familiar with the ins and outs of the conflict, having as a Massachusetts senator represented one of the most powerful Armenian diaspora communities.[25]

In his current role – as ought to be expected – he has shown that he can leave his legislative biases behind.[25]

But, importantly, he still holds the trust of Armenians: a crucial element to achieving a settlement.[25]

In the context of matters with Iran, Syria, the East China Sea, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it would seem that Nagorno-Karabakh might not warrant high-level U.S. and/or European attention. [25]

However, as Western forces withdraw from Afghanistan, cease moving supplies through the NDN and generally begin a strategic retreat from the former Soviet space, Washington and Brussels will quickly be left without a strategy for engaging Eurasia.[25]

Vladimir Putin’s recent pugnacity in Ukraine and plans for a Eurasian Union are engendered, at least in part, by the perception of Western abandonment of the region. [25]

By grasping the nettle of the Karabakh conflict, Western powers can begin to reformulate their Eurasia policy, from one in which the region is simply a thoroughfare to Afghanistan, to one of understanding the region as warranting strategic attention for its own sake.[25]


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































[1]http://transblawg.eu/2003/05/23/ beleidigung-defamation-insult-assault/


[2]http://transblawg.eu/2012/09/06/
beleidigunginsult-defamation-libel-slander-assault/

[3]https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%9Cble_Nachrede_(Deutschland)

[4]https://dejure.org/gesetze/StGB/186.html

[5]https://www.advocard.de/streitlotse/
arbeit-und-karriere/ueble-nachrede-und-verleumdung-dies-sind-ihre-rechte/

[6]http://www.alibris.com/
Sack-on-Defamation-4th-Ed-Libel-Slander-and-Related-Problems-Robert-D-Sack/
book/29210264

[7]http://www.nacua.org/nacualert/
memberversion/employmentrefs/clothier_01c.doc

[8]https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?
action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&srctype=smi&
srcid=3B15&doctype=cite&docid=100+Colum.+L.+Rev.+294&
key=3466dcf4819b15a94958e7a41f515067


[9]http://www.rochester.edu/pr/Review/V71N5/gazette02.html

[10]http://www.bna.com/sack-robert-m17179893806/


[11]https://www.law.ua.edu/pubs/lrarticles/
Volume%2066/Issue%202/Sack.pdf

[12]http://blog.artistsmarketonline.com/
uncategorized/what-is-defamation

[13]http://cardozoaelj.com/wp-content/uploads/
Journal%20Issues/Volume%2025/Issue%201/Medenica.pdf

[14]http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=3494&context=wmlr

[15]171 F. at 556; accord Hutchinson Smoke Burner Co.,
19 S.W. at 806; Balt. Life Ins. Co.,51 A. at 1024.

[16]134. See, e.g., Crosby v. Bradstreet Co.,
312 F.2d 483, 485 (2d Cir. 1963); Oakley,
Inc., 819 F. Supp. 2d at 1092; Mahmoodian v. Pirnia,
No. 3:11-CV-00005, 2012 WL 4458160, at *9
(W.D. Va. June 7, 2012); Am. Univ. of Antigua Coll.
of Med. v. Woodward, No. 10-10978, 2010
WL 5185075, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 16, 2010)

[17]http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1216&context=fss_papers


[18]See, e.g., R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED
PROBLEMS 1 (1980). This tendency perhaps reached its zenith
in a recent article which began: "American libel law
came into being only 22 years ago, with the Supreme
Court's 1964 decision in the New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan case."Sanford, Some Lessons in Libel:
A Primer on the Danger Zones, WASH. J. REV., March 1986, at 28.


[19]http://www.lo-recht.de/verleumdung.php

[20]https://www.mittelstandswiki.de/wissen/
%C3%9Cble_Nachrede_und_Rufsch%C3%A4digung_im_Web_2.0

[21]http://fordhamlawreview.org/wp-content/
uploads/assets/pdfs/Vol_83/No_1/Kern_October.pdf

[22]http://www.unian.info/world/
1422617-us-rejects-asylum-to-turkeys-nato-base-commander
-suspected-of-complicity-in-coup-bid.html

[23]http://www.unian.info/war/
1473709-russian-proxies-attack-ato-forces
-52-times-in-last-24-hours-use-heavy-weapons.html

[24]http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/
nagorno-karabakh-isnt-disputed-territory%E2%80%94its-occupied-16141

[25]http://www.fletchersecurity.org/#!petersen/c1aiy


























































































































































































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